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Eight years in the evolution of a procurement coininand
were studied to determine the effect of organization size on
structural differentiation across time. The Moore and Haga
percentile role differentiation indicator was examined for
its utility in measuring structural differentiation. The
results indicated that growth and decline were not symmetric
and that the direct output labor component remained approxi-
mately constant in size during decline while the other com-
ponents shrank. The percentile role differentiation indica-
tor was found to have both theoretical and practical value
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Recent research into the formal dimensions of organiza-
tion structure has emphasized mathematical modeling of the
relationship between size and complexity. The preponderance
of the current work, however, has used cross-sectional data
rather than time series data that would consider growth as
a process. Starbuck (1965) emphasized the necessity for time
series studies of the growth of organizations:
"...If a few people will commit themselves to
build formal models, to collect detailed time
series data on individual organizations over
several years, and to confront models with data
in a rigorous way
. . . the beginnings of a
general theory will appear."
B. LITERATURE ON SIZE AND STRUCTURAL DIFFEPvENTIATION
1. Cross-sectional Studies
Hall (1967) suggested that size may be irrelevant
as a factor in determining structural differentiation because
he found that complexity could not be predicted from
organization size.
Blau and Schoenherr (1971) , in a more recent study
based on cross-sectional data, found that a logarithmic
transformation of size, as measured by total numbers employed,




Freeman and Hannan (1974) , in reviewing the literature
on the relationship of administrative intensity and size,
found that cross-sectional research inherently assumed a
symmetric relationship between growth and decline.
A problem with cross-sectional studies is that data
collected at a single point in time on various sizes of
organizations result in synthetic growth curves. Growth is
a dynamic process and may not be adequately represented by
size ordered sets of static measurements.
2 . Time Series Studies
Tsouderos (1955) found that, during organization
growth, changes in administrative employment were positively
associated with changes in size, while during periods of
organization decline they were negatively associated with
changes in size.
Haire (1959) , in a longitudinal study of four indus-
trial firms, related size and complexity. His theoretical
model was an organismic one that emphasized growth as a
process and using this biological model he was able to fit
longitudinal data into simple mathematical models.
Hendershot and James (19 72) , in a two point time
series study, found a negative relationship between size and
the administrative-production (A/P) ratio.
Moore (1974) , in summarizing the literature on size
and structural differentiation, indicated that the primary
defect in both time series and cross-sectional studies was

the lack of data based upon studies that encompassed more
than two time points
.
3. Mathematical Models
Blau (19 70) developed a mathematical model of the
relationship between size and structural differentiation.
Major theoretical propositions generated by this model were
that role differentiation was (a) a monotonically increasing
function of size while (b) the rate of increase was a de- »
creasing function of size.
Mayhew et al. (19 72) proposed an algorithm that gen-
erated all logically possible values of role differentiation
for varying sizes of organizations while holding constant
all other variables influencing a role structure.
Specht (1973) , in examining the baseline model of
Mayhew et al^. (1972) , found that it was based upon an assump-
tion that limited the model to hierarchical organizations.
Moore and Haga (1975) proposed algorithms that gen-
eralized the size-role differentiation models under different
assumptions about the skill uniqueness of organization members
and the uniqueness of organization roles.
C. OBJECTIVE
This study investigated the managerial utility and theo-
retical value of the probabalistic baseline generator developed
by Moore and Haga (19 75) . Data on structural variables were
gathered from archives of an U.S. Navy procurement command.

The objective was to examine the relationship between size
and structural differentiation over the life span of an
organization to determine the usefulness of Moore and Haga's







The data was gathered from the headquarters of the Naval
Ordnance Systems Command, Washington, D.C. (NAVORD) . The
Bureau of Naval Weapons, which represented an amalgamation
of the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Aeronautics , was
disestablished in 1966 and two separate commands. Naval Air
Systems and Naval Ordnance Systems Command v;ere created in
its place. In May 19 66, NAVORD became responsible for the
acquisition and maintenance of surface and underwater ordnance
This arrangement lasted for eight years. In July 1974, NAVORD
V7as m.erged with Naval Ship Systems Command to form Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) . This study encompassed the growth
and decline of NAVORD across its eight year life span. The
organization was staffed by naval officers and civil servants.
NAVORD 's procurement tasks are now performed by its successor,
NAVSEA. A sample of one organization across eight years
limits the generalizability of the findings. This was
necessary, however, within the economics of an exploratory
study.
B. DESIGN OF DATA COLLECTION
The NAVORD organization manual, including changes, and
telephone directories provided most of the data on structural
variables. Additional data were found in the "plans of the
day" published by NAVORD. Organization charts developed from
11

Ls data were verified with management people in NAVSEA who
1 formerly worked in NAVORD. Further details on structure,
JLaries, and funding were collected by the author during a
ir of duty (1971-1973) at NAVORD. This participant-observer ,
id
vantage insured that structural indicators derived from
janization charts and other archival data accurately repre-
ited the reality of NAVORD.
Organization charts of NAVORD were constructed for each
ir. A list of roles in this organization was prepared for
;h year indicating the nmnber of people in each job.
ANALYSIS STRATEGY
Moore and Haga (19 75) examined the role differentiation
an organization using tvro variables:
s = size (number of employees)
k = number of roles
nming over all possible arrangements of £ persons in k roles
ilded the numlDer of ways of assigning people to roles.
)re and Haga developed five general assumptions about the
Lqueness of roles and people. NAVORD fitted Assumption V,
it roles are interchangeable and people are interchangeable.
3ple are interchangeable if individuals switch positions
i do not cause a new valid organizational arrangement.
Les are interchangeable when a new ordering of roles does
^
t produce another valid way of organizing. A basic assump-
3n of this algorithm is that within a role people are al-
^s interchangeable. Using these assumptions , the number
ways of assigning s people to k roles is:
12





lere the braces denote the integer part of the value enclosed
(s)
d U-. — is an Lth order polynomial m s as described in the
chnical report of Moore and Haga (1975) . This function gen-
ates a table of probabilities', p(k,s). Moore and Haga •.
ated that a way of assessing the structural differentiation
^
a given organization was by noting the probability that







. pM (k,s) = Z p(i,s) = P[K <*k|s] f'
^ i=l
t -~
ere M, (k ,£) is the percentile indicator of role differen-
ation ranging from 0% to 100%. The percentile role differ-
tiation indicator (PRDI) was constructed in such a way that
did not vary with the size of the organization. The rela-
ve complexity of organizations cf different sizes can be ^^-'
mpared according to their respective PRDI because they in-
cate how much of an organization's empirical complexity is
'e to variables other than size alone. In this study, the
iDI measured role differentiation where roles were defined
particular jobs within the organization, such as secretary
;
project engineer. Size was measured by the number of




PRDI values were calculated for the total size and asso-
ciated number of roles of NAVORD for each of its eight years.
A conventional administration-production ratio was calculated
for each year as:
A/P = (L+S+C)/D
where
A/P = ratio of administrative personnel to
production personnel
L = number of line management positions
S = number of staff positions with no line
management responsibilities
C = number of clerical positions
D = number of direct output positions
Distinctions between line and staff segments of NAVORD were
made with the organization's own line and staff codes contained
in its command history. Direct output positions were defined
here as line coded jobs that (a) exercised no supervision and
(b) were involved with the design and acquisition of naval
ordnance from defense contractors.
The strength of association between the PRDI and A/P
ratios, as well as other structural and financial variables
were examined by multiple regression analysis.
Since the sample was small the significance of differences
between correlation coefficients was assessed with the t-test
14

(Chambers 19 52) which provided the power needed for small
samples. When the sample was split into growth and decline
periods, the degrees of freedom decreased to the point where
the relationships implied, although statistically significant,
could not be relied upon to exist. This lack of reliance
occurred when r had to be greater than .997 to be significant
for P = .05. The degrees of freedom decreased for two rea-
sons: (a) the mode was used to determine that there was both
growth and decline, using the mode of a data set decreases
the degrees of freedom by one, and (b) the number of observa-
tions dropped to four during growth and to six during decline.
An element of caution must be introduced in any interpretation
of the results since some of the correlations may be spurious-





To test that archival data were an unbiased estimate of
the actual organization parameters, a comparison of means
test was made between the data on size from (a) the basic
archives and from (b) payroll data. The number of paid sala-
ries was obtained independently of the archival data from a
former NAVORD employee, now in NAVSEA, who had been respon-
sible for submitting periodic reports on General Schedule
employee grade levels. This relationship is shown in Figure
1. With n = 9, the comparison of means test results were
t = - 1.43 and F = - .36 indicating less than a 5% chance
that the archival data on size, and the payroll data on size
could have been from different organizations.
B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The structural evolution of NAVORD consisted of two major
periods. From 1966 to 1969, the organization expanded rapidly
at first and then slowly approached its greatest size of 12 75
people. From 1969 to 1974, the organization shrank rapidly
because of a Reduction In Force (RIF) , equivalent to a civil-
ian layoff, required by the Revenue and Expenditure and Con-
trol Act of 1968 that returned all federal organizations to
the employment levels of 30 June 1966. This period of decline
was not one of uniform shrinkage; the reaction to the RIF had
tapered off by 19 70 and NAVORD remained at approximately the
16

same size until 19 72 when decline set in once again and con-
tinued until NAVORD was merged with NAVSEA in July 19 74.
Table II contains the annual figures for each of the periods
and Appendix B includes the archival data collected on the
organization for its total life.
Analysis of empirical correlations of size and role
differentiation data, Table I, revealed statistically signi-
ficant differences over time. The growth process and subse-
quent decline were not mirror images of each other. The per-
centage of line management, staff, direct output, and cleri-
cal positions remained approximately steady during both growth
and decline as can be seen from Figure 3. During growth, the
number of line managem.ent and direct output positions grew
faster than the number of staff positions as shown by an
examination of the slopes of the lines in Figure 2. During
decline, the number of direct output positions remained
approximately steady while the number of line management and
staff positions declined. Figure 2.
C. PERCENTILE ROLE DIFFERENTIATION INDICATOR
The percentile role differentiation indicator (PRDI) , for
the period 1966-74, Figure 4, was related, in a statistically
significant way, to the number of roles (r = .89); to time
(r = -.84), and to the number of assigned military personnel
(r = .71). The relationship between PRDI and size was not
statistically significant (r = .19) nor was it related to the
A/P ratio (r = -.01) .
17

During growth (1966-69) PRDI was not signficantly related
to any other variable but during decline (1969-74) it was
related to average GS grade level (r = -.81) and to the number
of roles (r = .94) .
D. ADMINISTRATION-PRODUCTION RATIO
The A/P ratio, for the period 1966-74, was found to be
negatively related, in a statistically significant way, to
the number of line management positions (r = -.72); to the
number of direct output positions (r = -.95); to size (r = -.71);
to the number of staff roles (r = -.72); to the Operation and
Maintenance (O&MN) funds available (r = -.72); to the procure-
ment (OPN) funds available (r = -.92) , and to the total funds
available to NAVORD (r = -.32). O&MN funds are a category of
funds in the federal budget which are used to operate and main-
tain naval forces. OPN funds are a category of procurement
funds in the federal budget which are used for the procure-
ment of production quantities of naval ordnance. The total
funds available to NAVORD were figures representing the sum
of O&MN + Headquarters Overhead + OPN - civilian salaries.
The relationship of A/P ratio to size was also statistically
significant (r = -.71) but the relationship to time was not
significant (r = -.09)
.
During the growth period (1966-69) the A/P ratio was only
significantly related to chief executive span (r = 1.00),
but during the period of decline (1969-74) , a statistically
significant relationship was found with the number of direct




The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of
organization size on structural differentiation across time
in a large bureaucracy. The utility of the percentile role
differentiation indicator compared to the conventional A/P
ratio was also examined.
A. SIZE AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION ACROSS TIME
As measured by the PRDI, increasing size generated no
increase in complexity and decreasing size was accompanied by
a decrease in complexity which only had a 5% chance of occur-
ring because of changes in size alone. Cross-sectional stu-
dies inherently assum.ed a symmetric relationship betv;een
growth and decline, Freeman and Hannan (19 74) and when this
assumption was confronted with time series data on a single
organization over an eight year life span, the empirical
results did not support a symmetrical relationship.
The more rapid growth of line management and direct out-
put positions as compared to staff positions was a result that
supported the conventional wisdom that the staff portion grows
more slowly than the output oriented portion of an organiza-
tion. Contrary to expectations from the organizational growth
literature, the direct output component of NAVORD remained
approximately steady during the decline while the line manage-
ment and staff components shrank. The interesting result here
was that complexity was decreasing as size decreased, as shown
19

by the PRDI , which meant that the number of roles must also
have been decreasing, since the PRDI was invariant with size,
and at the same tim.e that size was decreasing an individual
component of size was remaining constant. The component which
remained constant was the number of direct output positions.
This implied that the conventional wisdom that the staff
component is most resistant to decline, Haire (1959) , was
not supported by the results of this study.
The forces which affected NAVORD during decline were dif-
ferent from those that affect industrial firms. Civil Service
rules and regulations inhibit the attrition process in federal
bureaucracies, impeding it in quite different ways from those
experienced in industry. Appendix A presents a deatiled dis-
cussion of the attrition process in the Department of Defense.
A deliberate effort was made by NAVORD executives to mitigate
the effects of the attrition process by limiting RIFs to the
one in 1969-1970, by using hiring restrictions, by encourage-
ment of early retirement, and by imposing grade level restric-
tions on all elements of the organization. These measures
led to retirement of supervisory personnel from both line and
staff codes with the most seniority, to the absorption of
specialized roles into more general ones, and to a lessening
of structural differentiation as indicated by the declining
number of roles, the shrinking of the A/P ratios and most
clearly by the smaller PRDI during the period of decline.
During the years 1969-1974 when NAVORD was declining, there
20

was a tendency for workers to lose their bosses while picking
up his work in addition to their own without being promoted.
This was especially true at retirement time each June.
Empirical results indicated that the percentage of line
management, staff, direct output, and clerical positions
(Figure 3) remained approximately steady through periods of
both growth and decline. The almost flat slope of these
curves gave the impression that the organization remained
at the same level of complexity throughout its life as indi-
cated by the constant percentages for line management, staff,
direct output and clerical positions. However, an examination
of the PRDI (Figure 4) shov/ed that this was not the case.
Structural differentiation varied across time.
B. UTILITY OF THE PERCENTILE ROLE DIFFERENTIATION INDICATOR
The percentile role differentiation indicator was not
expected to correlate with size if the measure was an orthog-
onal, i.e. size invariant, indicator of differentiation. Em-
pirical correlations (r = .19) showed that the PRDI values
were not a function of size. The A/P ratio correlated
negatively {r = -.71) with size.
The PRDI exhibited a negative relationship (r = -.84)
with time while the A/P ratio did not (r = -.09). The annual
PRDI values were different enough to suggest that structural
differentiation was not constant across time.
When the periods of growth and decline were examined
separately the PRDI related with the number of roles (r = .94)
21

during decline. This repeated the relationship (r = .89)
found for the overall life span. Since the PRDI was developed
using the number of roles as an entering variable, the rela-
tionship with number of roles was expected. Several other
statistically significant correlations were found but they
did not echo similar relationships found with the complete
life cycle and were thus considered to be statistical artifacts
of over-worked data.
The lack of correlation (r = -.01) between PRDI and A/P
ratio supported the notion that the PRDI was tapping a dif-
ferent dimension of organization reality. The PFIDI had a
baseline for the effect of size alone while the A/P ratio
is open to influences of unknown variables. If the user
wanted to see if an organization had become more or less
complex for its size, then PRDI would indicate that, but the
A/P ratio would not. A PRDI greater than 0.5 meant that the
organization was more complex than size alone would dictate
for this assumption and begged the question - what were the
other variables besides size making it more complex. If the
PRDI was constant then the effect of size was constant but
if it varied then effects of other variables were coming and
going from time to time. What other variables and when are
the questions.
From a theoretical viewpoint, when size and the number
of roles increased structural differentiation was greater,
PRDI = 96.82 to 95.82 during the growth period 1966-69,
Table II, and when size and the number of roles decreased
22

it was less, PRDI = 95.82 to 74.22 during the decline period
1969-74, Table II. This result supported Blau (1970) since
the number of roles equaled complexity for Blau. Mayhew
et al. (1972) developed a proposition from their baseline
generator which also stated structural differentiation was
a monotone increasing function of size. This proposition was
not generated by the empirical results of this study.
At a practical level the PRDI is of more use to a manager
than a conventional indicator such as the A/P ratio. The
PRDI tells a manager where his organization's role differen-
tiation stands in comparison to the logically possible com-
plexities for its size. For instance, a PRDI value of 96.82
means that 96.82% of the organizations of, say, size 866
would have less than 14 7 roles as a result of size alone
according to a distribution of all the logically possible
arrangements of s_ people in k roles. If a manager compared
the number of roles in his organization to its size on a
periodic basis, he would be able to tell from PRDI values
whether it was staying at the same level of complexity. Haire
(1959) proposed that organizations grow in those areas where
most threatened by either lack of internal resources, such
as line managers unable to cope with specialized tasks in
purchasing, or in the area of providing information for con-
trol and coordination. An alternative formulation is that
the complexity of an organization is a reflection of the
organization's response to its environment. A manager who
23

wished to model the possible effects of growth and decline
in the size and/or number of roles of his organization could
employ a sensitivity analysis using the PRDI as an indicator
of complexity. The goal would be to match the complexity with
the environment using historical data on appropriate levels
of complexity for given environments.
The A/P ratio does not allow a managerial user to relate
A/P ratio values to any baseline. There are no standard in-
dustry A/P ratios nor are there any for government bureauc-
racies. An A/P ratio involves the researcher and the manager
in taxonomical problems. The organization must be categorized
into line management, staff, direct output, clerical and other
groupings to permit calculation of the A/P ratio. Taxonomi-
cal consistency with differing observers is problematic. The
PRDI does not suffer from this problem since measurem.ent of





The study of a large federal bureaucracy across time
indicated that growth and decline were not symmetric. The
conventional wisdom that the staff portion remains as a
residual while direct output labor shrinks in a declining
organization was not supported by this study. The utility
of studying an organization through growth and decline across
time, as suggested by Starbuck (1965) was supported by the
results of this study in that time series data showed growth
and decline as processes. When these processes were examined
the assumption of symmetry in an organization's growth and
decline inherent in cross-sectional studies seems to be false.
By confronting a cross-sectional model with time series data
theory has becom.e more general by the challenging of the
assumption of symmetrical growth and decline.
The percentile role differentiation indicator proposed
by Moore and Haga (1975) was found to be invariant with size
and both theoretically and practially useful as a m.easure of
structural differentiation. Read across time, a series of
PRDI values for an organization tells the effects of variables
other than size on a growing/declining organization's com-
plexity. In cross-sectional analysis, PRDI values remove
the logical effects of size alone on the complexity of a
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Growth and Decline Data
GROWTH 1966-1969
66 67 68 69
SIZE 866 1085 1197 1275
PRDI 96.82 96.29 95.75 95.82
DECLINE 1969-1974
69 70 71 72 73 74
SIZE 1275 1144 1177 1179 1082 966
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ABSTRACT
Reductions-in- force (RIF) in the federal bureaucracy
are discussed in terms of history, Public Law 90-364, control
of grade escalation, alternatives to reduction-in-force and
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Reduction-in-force may be necessary because of conditions
inside or outside a federal agency. Management may reduce
certain phases of its work as the workload changes. Appro-
priations may be reduced or cut off entirely, or the agency
may be allowed to use only part of its appropriation. These
and other factors occurring singly or in combination may make
it necessary for the agency to have a reduction-in-force (RIF)
RIF may require the separation of all employees in part
of an agency, or may require separation of some and shifting
about of others. Small reductions may require no involuntary
separations when there are enough transfers, retirements, and
other voluntary losses. Some reductions require no reduction
in the number of employees because they are accomplished
through reorganization.
The agency determines when there is a surplus of employees
at a particular location in a particular kind of. work. A
surplus of employees in any part of an agency requires the
agency to determine whether employees will:
1. be assigned to vacant positions
2. be adversely affected for reasons related to performance
or conduct




Before World War II the reduction-in-force policies and
procedures of the federal government were geared to a peace-
time situation. In 1945, new reduction-in-force regulations
were issued which reflected the reinstatement provisions of
the Selective Service and Training Act of 19 40. After World
War I the morale and administrative efficiency of the career
federal service were severely damaged by the unsystematic
methods used to reduce the size of the civil service. In
anticipation of another series of postwar problems, since
19 42, new employees had been granted only temporary "war
service" status. This action permitted orderly RIF policies
since these employees knew they didn't have permanent status
and expected to be laid off at the end of the war. However,
many personnel offices acted as outplacement offices, during
1945 and 1946, to ameliorate the effects of the liquidation
of war service only jobs. These same policies and procedures
were once again used during the Korean War. Plans were made
to prevent any sizable increase in permanent status personnel
so that once again RIFs could be managed effectively.
RIF plans of this era were based upon the following
concepts: competitive area, competitive level, retention
groups and subgroups, retention credits and retention rights.
Competitive Area — the part of an agency within a local
commuting area within which employees are considered to be in
competition within their respective levels.
44

Competitive Level — all positions in the same grade of
the same service, trade or profession, within a competitive
area which can be occupied by an interchange of incumbents
with minimal training.
Retention Group — personnel are placed in groups based
upon tenure of employment. Within each group are four
subgroups based upon veterans preference and performance
ratings.
Retention Credits — are credits for length of service and
performance ratings which are used in determining retention
register standing in each retention subgroup.
Under the federal reduction-in-force program,
the personnel office of an agency is notified,
by one or more line divisions of the agency,
of the number and title of filled positions
which are to be abolished. It must be stressed
that, under the federal program, initiation of
the reduction-in-force process is notification
to the agency personnel office in terms of
positions to be abolished, not individual
employees to be separated. In order to select
the individual employees who are to be separated
in the reduction-in-force action, competitive
areas, and competitive levels are determined by
the personnel office, and employees are placed
in a retention order in the competitive levels
affected. This order is shown for a particular
competitive level on a retention register. A
retention register is compiled for each
competitive level in which a reduction-in-force
is to be made, and it shows the names of all
employees in competition by retention groups
and subgroups. /2 . 315
Bumping — The process whereby one employee with more
retention points displaces another employee . Van Riper /!_
states that by 1952 there were 2 3 RIF categories, bumping
45

was endemic even for small RIFs and that the costs of
implementing a RIF often exceeded the anticipated economies.
During the Eisenhower administration action was taken
in 195 3 on a Civil Service Commission proposal to rectify
the RIF category problem. Retention categories were reduced
from 23 to 6 and bumping rights were restricted by geograph-
ical area and organizational unit. Retention groups were
divided into "career", "career-conditional" and "indefinite"
employees and each group was divided into veteran and non-
veteran groups. This improvement of RIF procedures reduced
the bad effects on employee morale and organizational effi-
ciency produced by the combination of too many categories and
unrestricted bumping. The reductions-in- force at the end
of the Korean War did not involve as many people as at the




The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act (PL 90-364) was
signed into law by President Johnson on Friday, 28 June 1968
which made Section 201, limiting federal civilian employment,
effective Monday, 1 July 1968. The law established two cate-
gories for personnel limitations: 1 - full-time employees
in permanent positions (FTP) and 2 - full-time employees in
temporary positions and part-time employees (TPT) . The law
stipulated that the FTP must decrease gradually to their 30
June 1966 level by filling only three out of four vacancies
that occur during any period due to resignation, retirement,
removal or dath. The TPT employees are limited by a monthly
ceiling that is the same as the on-baord count during the
corresponding month of calendar year 1967.
Quick action was taken to implement this law by the
Executive Brance because the FY 69 Military Appropriation
bills were before Congress and during the hearings DOD could
expect queries on the implementation of PL 90-364. A Presi-
dential memorandum of 2 8 June stressed the necessity for com-
pliance and stated that compliance must not be mechanistic.
Within the Department of the Navy, the alternative of re-
stricting all activities to hiring 75% of the number of those




a - 75% hiring would be mechanistic and ignore the
discretionary aspects of the law
b - it would ignore budgetary decisions already made
c - it would ignore substantial variations in
attrition rates due to local conditions.
The Navy implementation of PL - 90-364 is reflected in
the SECNAV instruction issued on 18 July /8. In summary the
Navy would:
1 - Predict the required attrition under the 75%
rule for the Department,
2 - Adjust the FY 1969 total budgeted end strength
by program decisions so that the decrease in
personnel strength would approximate the required
attrition.
3 - Use quarterly ceilings to approach the adjusted
total budgeted end strength gradually.
These restrictions quickly impacted on the various com-
mands within the Navy as evidenced by the NAVORD note /5
which restricted addressees to filling only three out of
every four vacancies that occured after 9 August 1968 and
indicated that substantially reduced civilian ceilings had
been received for 30 September 1968 and even further reduced
ceilings for 30 June 1969. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) attempted to determine the impact of Section 201 of
PL 90-364 upon the Department of Defense and conducted a
48

survey /£ with the Navy as the primary object. One of the
findings of this survey was that the Navy elected to use
ceiling control rather than a percentage rehiring authority
to implement the law.
49

CONTROL OF GRADE ESCALATION
The Department of the Navy's average grade rose from
7.13 on 30 June 1968 to 7.81 on 30 June 1971, a rise of 0.68.
A review of employment statistics for the Department of the
Navy covering the 1968-1971 period shows that, while total
graded employment decreased substantially, the decrease was
disproportionately large in the lower grades. In fact, the
number of employees at GS-8 and above actually increased.
This rise in average grade was caused by conversion of con-
tract engineering technicians to civil service status, changes
in classification standards by the Civil Service Commission,
changes of certain classes of ungraded employees to graded
status and possibly some promotions which were a result of
outstanding performance although the duties of the position
remained substantially unchanged. SECNAV instruction 5310.14
/3 provided a general plan to reverse the escalation of the
period 1968-1971. It specified a 0.15 reduction in average
grade level for the Navy's General Schedule employees by 30
June 19 72 and an additional 0.15 reduction by 30 June 19 73.
The Naval Material Command experienced a representative
growth for this period in that the average grade rose from
7.92 to 8.55, a rise of 0.63. In response to the SECNAV
guidance the Chief of Naval Material specified in NAVMAT
instruction 5310.6 /9 a 0.171 command wide reduction. The
50

formula was believed to be equitable because there had been
approximately equal escalation in all components of the com-
mand and because it was deemed unfair to unduly penalize
organizations with higher average grades since differences
in grade levels reflected differences in function and respon-
sibility. A key element in the Chief of Naval Material plan
was that reductions-in-force were not to be conducted solely
for the purpose of reducing average grade and that under
circumstances where RIFs were required they were to be struc-
tured to contribute as much as possible to average grade re-
duction. This type of command guidance in reducing grade
level seems very calm and organized but the realities faced
by components in the Naval Material Command were often harsher.
RADM Baughaii, Vice Coimnander, Naval Ordnance Systems Command
commented in September 19 71:
"When I arrived in NAVORD a year ago in August/
a RIF was in progress — caused by a percentage
cut in billets throughout headquarters Navy.
The cut involved both military and civilian
personnel as well as a cut in the & MN dollars
that pay salaries. The percentage was not
equally distributed so the Navy Material Command
took a higher share. Concurrently, we faced,
in NAVORD, a sizeable internal reorganization to
combine all the weapon system directorates into
one major acquisition directorate. You can
imagine the personnel anguish! It was traumatic
for everyone involved. And it came right on
top of a move from Main Navy to a new building." 711,24
The pressure to reduce average grade level has continued
with emphasis on intensified application of position manage-




to reduce average grade. Plans to implement reduction in
average grade through position management are based upon:
1 - Careful review of all programs to determine
which low priority activities can be reduced
or eliminated.
2 - Review of the organizational structure of each
unit to determine if approved staffing patterns
are still appropriate in view of program changes.
3 ~ Review of supervisory levels, with particular
attention to the extent of layering and the
need for deputies or assistants. Particular
attention is directed to those situations
where a military supervisor is supported by
a full-time civilian assistant.
4 - Evaluation of each position that becomes vacant
to determine whether it can be eliminated or
restructured at a lower grade.
5 - Vacancies which are supported by a Position
Management Review are to be filled at the entry
level except where serious impact on mission
will result from this action.
6 - Planning of the staffing of new programs in a
manner that will tend to lower the average grade.
If any new position is justified by a Position
Management Review, first consideration for filling




employee who is at the same grade level as
that of the new position.
7 - Vacancies are to be filled by promotion only
after
a - Reviewing the position to determine whether
it can be modified to fill at the entry
level or some lower level below the current
grade; if not
b - Determining that the duties cannot be
assumed by other existing positions; if
not
c - Determining whether the position can be
filled by the lateral reassignment of an
employee, preferably one whose position
can be restructured to a lower grade or
eliminated.
8 - Exploration of the feasibility of using technicians
where professional staff is not being utilized
at full skill level.
9 - Consideration of the opportunity of eliminating
certain positions through increases in productivity,
10 - Outstanding performance should be rewarded through
approved procedures such as quality salary increase
and case award rather than by promotion.
11 - Reorganization of work or re-engineering of
positions so that the work can be accomplished




12 - Reductions-in-force will not be conducted solely
to reduce average grade. Where required for
other reasons, RIFs should be structured to con-
tribute as much as possible to reduction of
grade, specifically, positions selected for
elimination should be at upper as well as lower
grade levels.
In spite of the excellence of these plans reductions-
in-force have occurred in the period 19 6 8-19 74. The yearly
issue of notices and instructions, by all levels in the
Department of Defense, concerning control of grade escala-
tion in the General Schedule bears mute testimony to the
extreme difficulty of controlling the size and average grade
level of the federal workforce. RIFs can be caused by lack
of work or funds or the need to m.ake room for an employee
with reemployment or restoration rights in addition to those
resulting from reorganizations or downward reclassification,
however, the majority have been the result of conscious





RIFs are a highly sensitive area of employee-management
relations and should be viewed as part of the overall person-
nel management concern of the agency. Mere literal adherence
to the regulatory and procedural requirements of RIF alone
doesn't make a sound management approach. People are hurt
in a RIF and this increases anxiety and adversely affects
morale. Planning is probably that aspect of RIF most often
neglected. Management must consider the personal impact of
the reduction and give the personnel management staff suffi-
cient lead time for advance planning. Proper planning can
lessen the potential effect of the RIF, prepare employees
for the RIF and forestall administrative problems caused by
hasty action. Federal agencies have worked out a variety
of solutions to the RIF problem:
1 - Obtaining special authority from the Civil
Service Commission to extend temporary appointments
2 - Detailing employees on a reimbursable basis to
other agencies.
3 - Meeting individually with employees eligible
for optional or involuntary retirement to explain
its benefits.
4 - Placing employees who desire it on leave without
pay until the beginning of the next fiscal year.
5 - Making maximum use of waives of qualifications




6 - Using furlough to defer lump-sum payments until
the next quarter of the fiscal year, when defer-
ment may permit recall of the furloughed employees.
7 - Assigning career employees out of a unit for
which RIF is planned, and into vacant continuing
jobs and hiring temporary employees to do the
needed work until the RIF occurs.
8 - When a backlog of work develops in one division
of an agency, personnel can be shifted from other
divisions to meet the backlog and the need to
hire new employees is avoided.
9 - Using extensive overtime, rather than hiring new
employees to avoid a RIF when the workload decreases
10 - Maintaining strict control over leave, to maintain
a minimum workforce, but one sufficient to meet
peak workloads.
11 - Giving advance notice to major field activities
when it is apparent that funds will be smaller
than programmed and advising field managers to
make maximum use of attrition and to minimize
hiring until a firm funding program is received.
12 - Analyzing continuing positions to identify those
for which a shortage of applicants exists and
taking steps to train employees facing possible
RIF.
13 - Requesting that the Civil Service Commission




RIF, for the purpose of authorizing early
voluntary retirements.
14 - In the Department of the Navy, use of the Cross
Series Management Development Program which
allows for reassignment of an individual in any
one of a number of occupational series for which
normally he would not qualify.
15 - Identification within an agency of high priority
vacancies for placement of surplus personnel.
The variety of strategies and tactics presented above gives
an indication of the organizational alternatives to an across-
the-board strategy of either percentage hiring or percentage
lay-offs. These alternatives are meant to be representative
rather than all-inclusive. Other tactics have been and will
be used.
When positive action is taken to avoid a RIF several
benefits accrue to the organization. Employee skills and
knowledge are retained that otherwise would have been lost.
Additional skills are developed in the case of employees
reassigned under lateral development agreements. The chain
bumping reaction result of a RIF is avoided. The disruption
of employee morale and efficiency attendant to advance notices
of RIF is also avoided. The agency can often gain an improve-
ment in morale resulting from the demonstration of managements'
concern. If a RIF is avoided or its effects lessened by




a heavy impact on reduction of average grade and introduction
of young employees into an aging workforce. In addition,
the smooth flow of work in the organization continues, the
economy of a community is not shaken and individuals and




DOD RESPONSES TO RIF
DOD Directive 1400.20 /16 specifies that:
"Firm measures will continue to be taken to
promote stability of employment for career
employees whose positions are affected by
shifting DOD manpower requirements and to
provide maximum opportunity for DOD-wide
placements through automated referral pro-
cedures. To minimize the adverse effect
on individuals affected by base closures,
consolidations, transfer of functions, and
reductions that result from the technological
and organizational changes necessary to
keep the DOD establishment up to date, a
strong program will be conducted.
The DOD Program for Stability of Civilian Employment includes:
1 - advance planning and notice to employees
2 - priority referral and placement within DOD
3 - retraining of employees
4 - payment of transportation and moving expenses
to a new DOD job
5 - income protection
6 - severance payments
These elements are explained in three manuals in the DOD
1400.20 series /17
,
/18 , /19 covering policies, procedures,
programs, counseling and inspection guidelines. The compre-
hensiveness of these procedures can be grasped when it is
realized that these three manuals are more than one and three
quarters inches thick and that they only represent the DOD
interpretation of the Federal Personnel Manual.
The Reduction In Force Information Pamphlet /I
5
is intended




as a check-list rather than as a compendium of all the infor-
mation he needs. Through this pamphlet he is acquainted with
placement assistance through the DOD Priority Placement Pro-
gram, the CSC Displaced Employee Program and the Local Place-
ment Program and he is also made aware of provisions for re-
location allowances. The employee is also given a brief des-
cription of his eligibility for discontinued service retirement,
deferred retirement and the refund of retirement deductions.
Further consideration is given to annual leave, sick leave,
final salary check, salary retention, severance pay, unemploy-
ment compensation, the Federal Employee Group Life Insurance
Program, the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program and
last but not least a discussion of what may be appealed and
appeal procedures. The employee is invited to get counseling
from his Civilian Personnel Office representative and to get
a copy of FED FACTS 13 on reduction-in-force in federal
agencies.
As can be seen the Department of Defense Program for
Stability of Civilian Employment along with the program for
Control of Grade Escalation in the General Schedule is a
massive Executive Branch response to the problem of reduction-
in-force. The sheer mass of regulations and programs, however,
clouds the picture and hides the often conflicting strategies





Reductions-in-force are a normal organizational response
to either external or internal events. Prior to World War
II most RTFs were agency responses to shifting workloads and
employee retention/reinstatement rights. Since World War II,
RIFs have been responses to Congressional requirements to
diminish the size and lessen the payroll of the federal work-
force. Public Law 90-364, unfortunately, was a Congressional
afterthought rather than the result of a well prepared, reasoned
approach to control of the federal bureaucracy. It appears
that constituent reaction to RIFs and their economic impact
on individuals and communities has tempered Congressional
zeal to the point where the Executive Branch is able to respond
with a multitude of plans for reduction and plans to reduce
the growth that occurred while the planned reduction was in
progress. My discussion with Mr. Richard Selby, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) in November 1974 indicated that substantial progress
had been made between 1964 and 1974 since less people were
working for the government in 1974 than in 1964. This rep-
resented a true reduction-in- force of approximately 20%.
This reduction has, unfortunately, not been accompanied by
an equally substantial reduction in average grade level.
Chapter 35, Title 5, United States Code states:
"The Civil Service Commission shall prescribe




employees in a reduction in force which give
due effect to —
1 - tenure of employment
2 - military preference
3 - length of service; and
4 - efficiency or performance ratings.
A preference eligible employee whose efficiency
or performance rating is "good" or "satisfactory"
or better than "good" or "satisfactory" is
entitled to be retained in preference to other
competing employees .... "
With the full force of the United States Code behind it, the
seniority system of tenured employees almost guarantees inef-
fective any plan to reduce both the size and the average grade
level of employees in the General Schedule. It would appear
that unless present laws and regulations are changed, that
the federal civil service will increasingly consist of aging,
tenured senior grade level employees who represent the rem-
nants of a once healthy civil service decimated by unplanned
RIFs, unsuccessful grade escalation control and increasing
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Data on the Organization
1966 .1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
#Paid Salaries 825 1052 1233 1301 1182 1171 1121 992 907
Size 866 1085 1197 1275 1144 1177 1179 1082 996
#Line mgt pos 105 165 168 167 106 134 124 120 102
#Direct pos 82 205 217 217 162 166 153 147 146
#Staff pos 521 560 676 728 704 695 698 636 571
#Clerical pos 166 166 148 172 179 195 209 183 191
#Roles 147 164 170 177 154 146 141 140 109
^Line roles 25 30 32 37 23 24 25 27 22
#Direct roles 28 41 41 43 27 26 25 24 26
SStaff roles 122 133 140 141 137 129 129 127 124
%Line mgt pos 12 14 14 13 9 11 10 11 10
%Direct pos 9 19 18 17 14 14 13 13 14
%Staff pos 60 52 56 57 61 59 59 59 57
%Clerical pos 19 15 '12 13 16 16 18 17 19
Ch. exec span 22 21 21 21 22 22 22 25 24
^Levels 10 12 12 13 11 13 13 12 12
#Groups 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 10
^Officers 190 142 140 143 140 141 124 96 96
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